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Abstract—Domain Name System (DNS) plays in important role
in the current IP-based Internet architecture. This is because it
performs the domain name to IP resolution. However, the DNS
protocol has several security vulnerabilities due to the lack of data
integrity and origin authentication within it. This paper focuses
on one particular security vulnerability, namely typo-squatting.
Typo-squatting refers to the registration of a domain name that
is extremely similar to that of an existing popular brand with
the goal of redirecting users to malicious/suspicious websites. The
danger of typo-squatting is that it can lead to information threat,
corporate secret leakage, and can facilitate fraud. This paper
builds on our previous work in [1], which only proposed majority-
voting based classifier, by proposing an ensemble-based feature
selection and bagging classification model to detect DNS typo-
squatting attack. Experimental results show that the proposed
framework achieves high accuracy and precision in identifying
the malicious/suspicious typo-squatting domains (a loss of at
most 1.5% in accuracy and 5% in precision when compared to
the model that used the complete feature set) while having a
lower computational complexity due to the smaller feature set (a
reduction of more than 50% in feature set size).
Keywords—DNS, Typo-squatting, Ensemble Feature Selection,
Bagging Ensemble Classification Model
I. INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol is an important
pillar in the Internet’s current and future architecture [2]–[5].
This is because it is the standard mechanism for name to IP
address resolution [2]. Moreover, it helps users to determine
the location of servers and mailing hosts, resulting in a direct
impact on the data exchange process [2,3].
However, DNS is vulnerable to a variety of security threats
and attacks, as illustrated by the recent DNS attacks [6,7]. One
example is the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on
Dyn in October 2016 which resulted in a significant portion of
America’s Internet Service to go down [8,9]. Another example
is the attack on a Brazilian Bank’s website. During this attack,
attackers rerouted the traffic targeted to the bank’s website
to their own servers. This was done by changing the DNS
registrations of all the bank’s domains, resulting in many users
divulging their authentication information to the malicious
attackers [10]. These vulnerabilities can be mainly attributed
to the lack of data integrity and origin authentication processes
included within the DNS protocol structure.
One such vulnerability that the DNS protocol suffers from is
that of typo-squatting. Typo-squatting refers to the registration
of a domain name that is extremely similar to that of an
existing popular brand with the goal of redirecting users to
malicious/suspicious websites. This is done by registering
confusingly similar domain names that the user might not pay
attention to [11]. For example, the www.paypal.com domain
can be easily confused with www.paypa1.com domain. The
danger of typo-squatting is that it can lead to information threat,
corporate secret leakage, and can facilitate fraud [12,13].
Hence, it is crucial that DNS is able to tolerate failure and is
resilient to attacks given its importance to the proper functioning
of the Internet [7]. This has led to various researchers proposing
different mechanisms to combat and protect against failures and
attacks. One such mechanism is the DNSSEC protocol which
aims at addressing some of the security vulnerabilities of DNS
by providing data integrity and origin authentication [14]. Yet,
DNSSEC still can not address other attacks such as amplified
denial of service attacks [7,15]. Thus, it is important that more
efficient detection mechanisms are implemented that can protect
systems from the various attacks by better identifying malicious
queries.
This paper builds on our previous work in [1] which
only proposed majority-voting based classifier to detect DNS
typo-squatting. In contrast, this work proposes an ensemble-
based feature selection and classification (EFSBC) model to
detect DNS typo-squatting attack. This is done to reduce the
complexity of the DNS typo-squatting detection framework
while maintaining its high accuracy and low false positive
rate. To that end, this work presents a framework in which
three different feature selection techniques are combined to
identify features that are crucial for the accurate detection of
malicious/suspicious DNS domains. Moreover, the framework
proposes the use of bagging ensemble classification models (that
can reduce model variance) to further improve the accuracy of
DNS typo-squatting detection.
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• Proposing an ensemble feature selection method that selects
the crucial features using multiple selection techniques.
• Proposing a bagging ensemble classification model that
identifies malicious/suspicious domain names with high
accuracy.
• Evaluating the performance of the proposed model in
comparison to other traditional classification models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II describes the different security vulnerabilities that the DNS
protocol faces. Section III summarizes the previous work in
the literature. Section IV illustrates the proposed ensemble-
based DNS typo-squatting detection framework and discusses
its complexity. Section V describes the dataset considered in
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Fig. 1. DNS Vulnerabilities and Challenges
this work and the data transformation/feature extraction process.
Section VI presents the experiment setup and discusses the
corresponding results. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. DNS VULNERABILITIES & CHALLENGES
As mentioned earlier, the DNS protocol has several security
vulnerabilities due to the lack of data integrity and origin
authentication within it. Fig.1 briefly lists some of the different
vulnerabilities and attacks that DNS faces [7,12,16].
1) DDoS attacks: Root DNS services are vulnerable to DDoS
attacks. This is mainly due to the hierarchical architecture
adopted. This is dangerous as it can cause a loss of
availability of name resolution services which can lead
to the stoppage of Internet service [8,9,17]–[19].
2) Registrar hijacking: Malicious users can hijack a registrar.
As a result, these users would control all the corresponding
domain names. In turn, this can lead to enterprises and
companies losing their domain names. One such example is
the attack on a Brazilian Bank’s website [10]. As part of this
attack, all the traffic to the bank’s website was redirected
to the attackers own servers. This was possible because the
attackers changed the DNS registrations of all the bank’s
domains [10]. This attack had severe consequences with
thousands of users being affected due to the leakage of
sensitive information such as their banking, email, and FTP
credentials [10].
3) Cache Poisoning Problems: Cache poisoning is the result
of the lack of data update propagation or invalidations
mechanisms to DNS caches. Hence, cache poisoning can
be achieved using Name Chaining or Transaction ID
Prediction.
i- Name Chaining: Attacker adds random DNS names
in the DNS response which leads to the introduction
of false information into the cache.
ii- Transaction ID Prediction: Attacker sends multiple
DNS queries for domain names under his/her control.
Then the attacker hopes that the transaction ID in one
of the subsequent spoof replies matches the transaction
ID that is used as part of the queries between the two
servers.
4) Man in the middle (MiTM) attacks: Attacks such as Packet
Sniffing and Transaction ID Guessing are possible due to
the fact that the DNS protocol does not offer a mechanism
for servers to provide authentication details for the data sent
to clients. This can result in a threat to the users’ privacy
by directing them to suspicious or malicious domains and
servers.
i- Packet Sniffing: DNS reply packets can be intercepted
and modified by the attacker.
ii- Transaction ID Guessing: Attackers that can correctly
guess the transaction ID can send false replies to
legitimate queries.
5) Other DNS attacks: In addition to the attacks listed above,
DNS is also prone to other types of attacks such as
Information Leakage and Typo-squatting.
i- Information Leakage (DNS Tunneling): As part of this
attack, an attacker would leak sensitive information
as part of DNS queries or their responses.
ii- Typo-squatting: This attack focuses on registering a
domain name that highly matches that of an existing
domain name in an attempt to confuse/fool users.
This is dangerous as it can lead to information threat,
corporate secret leakage, and can facilitate fraud [12].
This work mainly focuses on the typo-squatting attack. This is
due to the severe consequences of such an attack including
leakage of corporate secrets, leakage of sensitive personal
information, and ultimately fraud [12]. Therefore, detecting
such attacks through efficient and intelligent mechanisms is a
necessity.
III. RELATED WORK
Securing the Internet has been a growing concern in recent
years given the growth in the number of attacks witness on
Internet services. Due to the abundance of data being collected
by Internet service providers and network administrators, ma-
chine learning (ML)-based mechanisms have been proposed
as a potential and viable efficient solution to help better
detect attacks on Internet services. For example, intrusion and
DDoS attack detection mechanisms using different classification
algorithms such as artificial neural networks and support vector
machines (SVM) have been proposed for Software-Defined
Networks (SDNs) [20]. Similarly, an optimized ML-based
anomaly detection framework was proposed that achieved
high accuracy and low false alarm rate [21]. Additionally,
decision tree (DT)-based algorithms have also been proposed as
effective DDoS attack detection mechanisms in cloud computing
environments [22]. Similarly, a tree-based intrusion detection
system for autonomous vehicles was proposed that achieves
high detection rate with a low computational cost [23].
Few works in the literature explored the use of ML within the
context of DNS security. Zhauniarovich et al. surveyed the state
of the art work on malicious domain detection through DNS data
anaylysis [24]. Bilge et al. proposed a DT-based classification
model to detect malicious domains [16]. Similarly, Sivakorn et
al. proposed the use of ML to detect malicious DNS queries [25].
Also, Sountharrajan et al. used deep learning models to detect
phishing URLs [26]. On the other hand, Almusawi proposed an
SVM model to detect DNS tunneling [27]. In contrast, Fukuda
et al. proposed the use of ML to classify originator activity
of DNS backscatter [28]. Weber et al. proposed the use of
unsupervised clustering to identify malicious domain campaigns
[29]. However, very few focused literature works focused on
the DNS typo-squatting attack.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Proposed Approach
This paper extends our previous work in [1] by proposing
an ensemble-based feature selection and bagging classification
(EFSBC) model to detect DNS domain typo-squatting. This
is done to reduce the complexity of the DNS typo-squatting
detection framework while maintaining its high accuracy and
low false positive rate. The proposed approach, as shown in
Fig. 2, can be divided into three components, namely:
1) Extract domain name representative features.
2) Develop an ensemble feature selection model to identify
crucial features.
3) Develop a bagging ensemble classification model to detect
malicious/suspicious domains.
Fig. 2. Proposed EFSBC Approach
B. Proposed Approach Application
As mentioned earlier, the proposed approach can be divided
into three main phases, namely the data transformation/feature
extraction phase, feature selection phase (using three different
feature selection mechanisms), and classification model phase. In
the data transformation/feature extraction phase, a set of features
representative of the typo-squatting attack are extracted. These
features mainly focus on the domain name and its characteristic.
Section V-B discusses this in more details.
The second phase, a sub-set of features are selected using
different feature selection mechanisms to be given to the classi-
fication model as input. This is done in an attempt to reduce the
complexity of the classification model and decrease its training
time without sacrificing its performance [30]. This is particularly
important when dealing with large scale systems generating
big data [30]. Three different feature selection mechanisms are
considered in this work representing three different categories
of feature selection algorithms. The first algorithm is the
correlation-based feature selection algorithm which belongs to
the group of “Traditional Statistical” feature selection techniques
[31]. The second algorithm is the information gain algorithm
which belongs to the group of “Information Theory” techniques
[32]. The third feature selection algorithm is the One Rule
algorithm which is one of the “Decision Tree” based feature
selection algorithms [33]. The results of these feature selection
mechanisms are combined to produce a subset of features
that are the highest ranked features from the dataset. The
mathematical details of these algorithms are given in Section
V-C.
After performing feature selection, the reduced feature dataset
is given as an input to the bagging ensemble model classifier. In
particular, a bagging ensemble model is chosen as it can reduce
the classification variance of any base model while maintaining
their low bias characteristics and improving the classification
accuracy [34]. Therefore, a bagging ensemble classification
model is adopted in this work with the aim of providing a
domain typo-squatting detection framework with high accuracy
and low false alarm rate.
C. Complexity of Proposed Approach
The complexity of the proposed approach is dependent on the
complexity of each of its phases, namely the feature extraction
phase, the feature selection phase, and the classification model
building phase. It is assumed that there are M data samples
and N features. Accordingly, the complexity of the feature
extraction phase is O(M) as the algorithm needs to go through
all the dataset to extract the N features.
The complexity of the feature selection phase depends on
the complexity of each of the feature selection methods consid-
ered. The complexity of Correlation-based feature selection
is O(MN2) to calculate all the class-feature and feature-
feature correlations [35]. On the other hand, the complexity of
information gain-based feature selection method is O(MN) to
calculate the joint probabilities of the class-feature interaction
[36]. Finally, the complexity of One Rule algorithm is O(MN)
given that you have to determine the classification accuracy
based on each feature [37]. Therefore, the overall complexity
of the feature selection process is O(MN2).
Finally, the complexity of the bagging ensemble classification
model is dependent on the type of base learners used as part of
the ensemble. In this work, the base learners considered are DTs
and K−nearest neighbors (KNN) due to their high accuracy as
shown in [1]. Given that building the bagging ensemble can be
performed in parallel, the complexity of the DT-based bagging
ensemble can be estimated as O(M2Nred) and the complexity
of nearest neighbor-based bagging ensemble can be estimated
as O(MNred) [38,39] where Nred is the size of the reduced
feature set.
By combining the computational complexity of the different
phases knowing that Nred < N , the overall complexity of
the proposed approach is in the order of O(MN2 +M2Nred)
assuming that the DT-based bagging ensemble classification
model is chosen. However, given that the feature selection
process can be performed offline, the complexity of the proposed
approach can be considered to be in the order of O(M2Nred).
V. DATASET DESCRIPTION
A. Data Preprocessing:
The dataset under consideration in this work was originally
collected by the authors of the “Data Driven Security” book [40].
The collection process consisted of a combination of Alexa’s top
1 million legitimate domains and Cryptolocker’s list of domains
generated algorithmically (DGA) [41]. The resulting dataset is
a list of 133,926 unique domains divided into 81,261 legitimate
domains and 52,665 DGA domains. Each record consists of
three fields as illustrated in Table I.
TABLE I
DOMAIN FEATURES DESCRIPTION
Field Description Example
Host Domain’s complete url www.mydaily.co.uk
Domain Actual domain accessed mydaily
Domain Class Domain classification Legit or DGA
B. Data Transformation/Feature Extraction:
The dataset was transformed using MATLAB into a new
dataset of eight features that characterize a unique domain name.
More specifically, these features were chosen due to the nature
of the typo-squatting attack which mainly focuses on modifying
the domain name. All the features under consideration are
numeric in nature. More specifically, the first four are integers
and the remaining being continuous.
In addition to the extracted features, a binary feature repre-
senting the domain class was also added to the new dataset.
In particular, a DGA domain was represented as 1 while a
legitimate domain was represented as 0. Table II shows the
value type and range of each of the aforementioned features.
TABLE II
DOMAIN FEATURES DESCRIPTION
Feature Value
Type
Range of
Values
Length of Domain Name Numeric [1,2,...,68]
Number of Unique Characters Numeric [1,2,...,36]
Number of Unique Letters Numeric [1,2,...,26]
Number of Unique Numbers Numeric [0,1,...,10]
Ratio of Letters to Domain Length Numeric [0-1]
Ratio of Numbers to Domain Length Numeric [0-1]
Ratio of Unique Letters to Unique
Characters
Numeric [0-1]
Ratio of Unique Numbers to Unique
Characters
Numeric [0-1]
Domain Class Numeric [0,1]
C. Feature Selection Techniques’ Background:
1) Correlation-based Feature Selection:
Correlation-based feature selection (CFS) is a simple algo-
rithm that selects feature subsets based on their correlation with
the class to be predicted [35]. In essence, CFS consider a feature
to be relevant if it is correlated with or predictive of the class
[35,42]. CFS mainly uses Pearson’s correlation coefficient as its
feature subset evaluation function. Accordingly, the evaluation
function is [35]:
MS =
k × rcf√
k + k × (k − 1)× rff
(1)
where:
• MS : merit of the feature subset S
• k: number of features in feature subset S
• rcf : average class-feature Pearson correlation
• rcf : average feature-feature Pearson correlation
Using this equation, the feature subsets can be ranked and the
subset with the highest correlation with the class to be predicted
can be selected.
2) Information Gain-based Feature Selection:
Information gain-based feature selection is based on the use
of information theory concepts such as entropy and mutual
information [36]. This algorithm selects features based on the
amount of information (in bits) that can be gained from these
features. Accordingly, the feature evaluation function is [36]:
I(F ;C) = H(F )−H(F |C)
=
∑
fi∈F
∑
cj∈C
P (fi, cj)log
P (fi, cj)
P (fi)× P (cj)
(2)
where:
• I(F ;C): mutual information between feature subset F and
class C
• H(F ): entropy/uncertainty of discrete feature subset F
• H(F |C): conditional entropy/uncertainty of discrete fea-
ture subset F given class C
• P (fi, cj): joint probability of feature having a value fi
and class being cj
• P (fi): probability of feature having a value fi
• P (cj):probability of class being cj
Using these values, the information gained from each feature
with respect to the class can be calculated and the highest
features can be selected.
3) One Rule-based Feature Selection:
One rule, also commonly referred to as “OneR” or “1R”,
algorithm is a simple one-level decision tree algorithm that
creates one rule for each feature in the training data and provides
an accuracy measure for that feature [43]. The main motivation is
that such a feature selection algorithm can achieve high accuracy
while still providing simple rules for humans to interpret and
understand [43]. The algorithm can be summarized as follows
[43]:
“For each feature f
For each value fi of feature f
Select set of instances where feature f has a value fi
Let cj be the most frequent class in that set
Set the rule: If feature f has value fi =⇒ class is cj
Output the feature/rule with the highest classification accuracy.”
Using this algorithm, the classification accuracy of each feature
can be calculated and the features can be selected.
VI. EXPERIMENT RESULTS & DISCUSSION
A. Experiment Setup
MATLAB was used in this work to transform the data from
its original state to the new desired dataset representing the pre-
viously provided features, perform the feature selection process,
and train the corresponding bagging ensemble classification
models.
B. Results & Discussion
The experiment results are divided into two sections, namely
the feature selection results and the bagging ensemble classifi-
cation model results.
1) Feature Selection:
Tables III shows the feature ranking using correlation algo-
rithm. Based on this metric, it can be observed in Table III that
the features can be divided into two main subsets. The features
within the first subset all have a correlation coefficient above
0.6 while the features in the second subset have a correlation
coefficient less than 0.4.
TABLE III
FEATURE SELECTION USING CORRELATION
Feature Correlation
Number of Unique Characters 0.663
Number of Unique Letters 0.653
Length of Domain Name 0.621
Number of Unique Numbers 0.329
Ratio of Numbers to Domain Length 0.281
Ratio of Unique Letters to Unique Characters 0.269
Ratio of Unique Numbers to Unique Characters 0.269
Ratio of Letters to Domain Length 0.242
Similarly, Table IV shows the information gain of the different
features. Again it can be observed that the first subset of features
all have an information gain above 0.4 while the second subset
has an information gain below 0.15.
TABLE IV
FEATURE SELECTION USING INFORMATION GAIN
Feature Information
Gain
Length of Domain Name 0.5803
Number of Unique Characters 0.4486
Number of Unique Letters 0.4220
Ratio of Letters to Domain Length 0.1358
Number of Unique Numbers 0.1154
Ratio of Numbers to Domain Length 0.1096
Ratio of Unique Letters to Unique Characters 0.0952
Ratio of Unique Numbers to Unique Characters 0.0952
The same observation can be seen in Table V which shows
the class prediction accuracy of the different features. In this
case, it is observed that the prediction accuracy of the first
subset of features is higher than 80% while that of the second
subset of features is lower than 70%.
TABLE V
FEATURE SELECTION USING ONER CLASSIFIER
Feature Accuracy of
Rule
Length of Domain Name 85.8729
Number of Unique Letters 82.0148
Number of Unique Characters 81.9193
Number of Unique Numbers 68.276
Ratio of Numbers to Domain Length 68.0303
Ratio of Letters to Domain Length 67.9281
Ratio of Unique Letters to Unique Characters 67.5331
Ratio of Unique Numbers to Unique Characters 67.5308
These results re-iterate the results shown in [1] which
illustrated that legitimate domains tend to have more memorable
names. In contrast, DGA domains usually have more unique
characters with the aim of increasing the randomness of the
resulting domain name generated. Accordingly, the subset of
features selected as input to the bagging ensemble classification
model is made up of 3 features out of the 8 extracted (more
than 50% reduction in the feature size), namely the length of
the domain name, the number of unique characters, and the
number of unique letters.
2) Bagging Ensemble Classification Model Performance:
As mentioned earlier, a bagging ensemble model was chosen
as it can reduce the classification variance of any base model
while maintaining its low bias characteristics and improving the
classification accuracy [34]. Two different bagging ensemble
models are considered, namely a decision-tree bagging ensemble
classifier and a K-NN bagging ensemble classifier. These base
learners where chosen due to their superior performance as
illustrated in [1]. Similar to our previous work [1], we use
accuracy, precision, recall, and F-score as our performance
metrics as per the equations in [44]. Table VI shows the results
of the two bagging ensemble models with the reduced feature
set in comparison with the two base learners when the full list
of features is used.
TABLE VI
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF CLASSIFIERS
Algorithm Accuracy
(%)
Precision
(%)
Recall
(%)
F-score
C4.5 [1] 88.1 84.5 95.8 0.89
K-NN [1] 88.2 83.8 94.3 0.89
Majority-voting
Ensemble
Classifier [1]
88.4 85.5 71.5 0.89
DT Bagging En-
semble Classifier
87.7 79.2 93.1 0.85
K-NN Bagging
Ensemble
Classifier
86.7 84.9 80.6 0.82
The results show that both the proposed decision-tree bagging
ensemble classifier and K-NN bagging ensemble classifier
still maintain a high accuracy, precision, and F-score values
despite being trained by a significantly smaller feature set. More
specifically, we observe that the degradation is at most 1.5%
in terms of accuracy and around 5% in terms of precision
while using less than 50% of the feature set. This further
emphasizes the efficiency of the proposed framework given
that it was able to maintain the high accuracy and precision
in identifying the malicious/suspicious domains while having a
lower computational complexity.
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORKS
Domain Name System (DNS) plays in important role in
the current IP-based Internet architecture. This is because it
performs the domain name to IP resolution. However, the DNS
protocol has several security vulnerabilities due to the lack of
data integrity and origin authentication within it [6,7]. This work
focused on one particular security vulnerability, namely typo-
squatting. Typo-squatting refers to the registration of a domain
name that is extremely similar to that of an existing popular
brand with the goal of redirecting users to malicious/suspicious
websites. This is dangerous as it can lead to information threat,
corporate secret leakage, and can facilitate fraud. This work
extended our previous work in [1] and proposed an ensemble-
based feature selection and bagging classification model to detect
DNS typo-squatting attack. Experimental results illustrated that
the proposed framework achieves high accuracy and precision
in identifying the malicious/suspicious typo-squatting domains
(a loss of at most 1.5% in accuracy and 5% in precision when
compared to the model that used the complete feature set) while
having a lower computational complexity due to the smaller
feature set (reduction of more than 50%).
Several potential research directions emerge to extend this
work. One potential direction is collecting and exploring the
impact of other features such as query sizes and timing. Another
direction is studying the impact of a hybrid model that combines
multiple techniques such as time series analysis and exploratory
data analytics to further our understanding of the data behavior.
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